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Abstract
We show that the insecurity claim of the αη cryptosystem made by C. Ahn and
K. Birnbaum in Phys. Lett. A 370 (2007) 131-135 under heterodyne attack is based
on invalid extrapolations of Shannon’s random cipher analysis and on an invalid
statistical independence assumption. We show, both for standard ciphers and αη,
that expressions of the kind given by Ahn and Birnbaum can at best be interpreted
as security lower bounds.
Key words: Quantum cryptography, Data Encryption, Random Cipher
PACS: 03.67.Dd
In [1], Ahn and Birnbaum claim to establish, by an approximate analysis, the
information-theoretic insecurity of the αη encryption system [2,3,4] even for
ciphertext-only attacks in which Eve makes heterodyne measurements followed
by classical processing. While information-theoretic security in the asymptotic
limit against such attacks has been claimed by us to be unlikely in [3,5], the
main purpose of this comment is to show that the arguments of [1] do not
establish insecurity of either the asymptotic or finite cases. We prove the
asymptotic insecurity of αη ciphertext-only attacks conjectured by us in [3,5],
and comment on its lack of practical significance. We also give some new
lower bounds on the average number of spurious keys of αη and other random
ciphers.
In Section 1, we describe the claim of [1] in the light of known results and
conjectures to explain that, despite its quantitative appearance, they have
not given a precise claim that can in principle be falsified. We also summarize
our position regarding Shannon’s random cipher and the claims of [1]. In
Email address: nair@eecs.northwestern.edu (Ranjith Nair).
Preprint submitted to Elsevier 25 October 2018
Section 2, we review the concepts of ‘unicity distance’ and average number
of spurious keys Nk of a cipher and the available results on them in the
standard cryptography literature. In Section 3, we extend these results to
random ciphers like αη. In Section 4, we critique the analysis of Ahn and
Birnbaum in detail. We also show that their approximate expressions can be
replaced by rigorous lower bounds (rather than approximate equalities) of
similar form in the light of our results of Section 3 and that these bounds
cannot be used to argue insecurity of any cipher. We also show that, for αη, a
true unicity point is never reached for finite n under known-plaintext attacks,
making it more information-theoretically secure than standard ciphers at least
for those attacks, contrary to the claim of [1]. Some concluding remarks are
given in Section 5.
1 Background and the Claim of [1]
Some specific security analyses and claims on αη have been given in [2,3,4,5]. In
particular, we have expressed [3,5] our belief that αη in its original form is not
information-theoretically secure under ciphertext-only and known-plaintext
attack for large enough n. Let H(K|Yn) be Eve’s key uncertainty given the
n-length ciphertext Yn. In other words, we claimed without a proof that, even
for ciphertext-only attacks, we would have
lim
n→∞H(K|Yn) = 0. (1)
We sketch a proof of this result for ciphertext-only attacks here. Since statis-
tical and known-plaintext attacks give Eve more information, (1) should be
expected to hold for these attacks as well. An LFSR gives a periodic output
of period 2|K| − 1 bits. In consequence, observation of the heterodyne attack
output over each such running key period provides Eve with successive ob-
servations of the same key corrupted by independent noise coming from the
totally random data. At worst, Eve can make her optimum estimate of the
key in each period and take a majority vote at the end. Intuitively, her prob-
ability of success goes to unity as the number of periods goes to infinity in
the same way as the average of many measurements of some quantity with
independent noise in each measurement tends to the true value as the number
of measurements goes to infinity.
Note however that eq. (1) has no practical implication on the security of αη
in real use since it is merely an asymptotic statement; see the discussion in ref.
[2]. In particular, the PRNG embedded into αη is not to be used longer than its
period 2L as in the case of standard ciphers, where L is the register length, thus
rendering the above insecurity argument inapplicable. For this reason, and the
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fact that the attack just mentioned is hugely inefficient, we have not gone into
a detailed proof. Ahn and Birnbaum in [1] implicitly make the same claim (1)
along with a purported proof based on analogy with Shannon’s random cipher
[6]. We stress that the argument just given is completely independent of that
of Ahn & Birnbaum, who provide no evidence for it beyond the analogy with
Shannon’s random cipher, regarding which we will outline our position below.
Against this background regarding (1), the only new claim with any quanti-
tative justification in [1] is their approximation
HE(K) ≈ L−QU for Q≪ n0 = L/U, (2)
where HE(K) is Eve’s equivocation on the key, L the seed key length, Q the
length of the data sequence, and U their upper bound on Eve’s information
per data bit. By analogy with the Shannon random cipher, the authors then
claim “Eve can determine K with high probability when ..”
Q(U + 1)≫ L+HE(K) (3)
and thus “the αη protocol is worse than the simple additive stream cipher”.
We find the extrapolation from (2) to (3) completely unwarranted and that (3)
itself has no more clear meaning than (1). Firstly, since there is no commonly
agreed meaning of the symbols “≈” and “≪”, these statements are not well-
defined. As they stand, they cannot be falsified, the possibility of the latter
being the hallmark of a meaningful scientific statement. More significantly for
our purpose, there is no reason why (2) is a good approximation in any sense
while there is reason to think that it is not, as we will show in detail in this
Letter.
Ahn and Birnbaum’s argument supporting (2), which is a heuristic one and
not a proof, is again based on a Shannon random cipher analogy which they
suggest would be applicable if the PRNG used satisfies a certain pairwise
independence condition between any two running key values.
On the one hand, we discuss in detail in Section 4 why their pairwise inde-
pendence condition is unlikely to lead to an approximate satisfaction of (2) in
whatever sense and degree they mean, which they have not specified.
On the other hand, we argue that an appeal by analogy to Shannon’s ran-
dom cipher ensemble cannot establish insecurity of any concrete cipher. Since
Shannon’s argument uses a large ensemble of ciphers, the average behavior of
this ensemble cannot be expected to resemble that of a given concrete cipher.
In consequence, we would not consider any security or insecurity claim that is
essentially based on a Shannon random cipher analogy to be reliable. While
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we have not examined the issue in detail, we believe that the agreement to
this model observed by Shannon for his ‘unicity distance’ for some concrete
ciphers for encrypting English is likely the result of the very special statistics
of English (or any other natural language) that make any cipher encrypting
English text quite weak.
However, we attempted to extract the possible meaning and identify the possi-
ble validity of the claim (2) above. It turns out that such a possible rendering
of (2), similar in form but not in content, has been given before [7,8] for
nonrandom ciphers without the necessity of appealing to Shannon’s random
cipher assumptions. In Section 3, we extend the results of Hellman [7] and
Beauchemin and Brassard [8] (HBB) to random ciphers (in the sense of Sec-
tion 2 (see also [3]), not that of Shannon) like αη and analyze it along this
rigorous rendering, different though it is from Ahn and Birnbaum’s claim.
2 Average number of Spurious Keys Nk and ‘Unicity distance’
The general form of a random cipher consists of an encryption map Ek(·)
applied by the sender Alice to a plaintext n-sequence Xn = X1 . . .Xn of sym-
bols each picked from an alphabet X resulting in a ciphertext n-sequence
Yn = Y1 . . . Yn:
Yn = Ek(X
n,Rn). (4)
with the ciphertext symbols belonging to a possibly different alphabet Y .
Note that the encryption map is indexed by the secret key selected randomly
from a possible set of values K and known only to Alice and the receiver Bob
and that the ciphertext is not determined by the key and plaintext alone but
rather requires an additional random variable Rn generated by Alice for its
complete specification. The key length |K| is typically of the order of a few 100
bits for standard ciphers like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The
ciphertext may be openly read by the eavesdropper Eve before reaching Bob,
who applies a corresponding decryption map Dk(·) to recover the plaintext:
Xn = Dk(Y
n). (5)
Observe that the decryption map Dk must function without Bob knowing R
n.
Further details on random ciphers may be found in [3] – we note here that a
random cipher usually uses a larger ciphertext alphabet so that Y 6= X - the
former may even be continuous as it is for αη under heterodyne attack.
4
Fixing a particular attack on a given cryptosystem, random or otherwise,
means that the eavesdropper Eve is assumed to know the joint probability
distribution Pr[XnYnK] of the plaintext, ciphertext, and key, and is in pos-
session of the corresponding ciphertext random variable Yn. In the case of
αη, where information is coded into quantum states, one must additionally
specify a quantum measurement whose result becomes the ciphertext Yn. In
the case of αη under heterodyne attack, X = {0, 1} and Y is R2 or C since the
heterodyne measurement gives two real numbers. Actually, only the argument
of the complex number result is useful to Eve and thus Y may be taken to
be the circle S1. In this Letter, we will consider only information-theoretic
security (IT security) and allow unlimited computational power to Eve.
In the cryptography literature, beginning with Shannon [6], the ‘unicity dis-
tance’ has been proposed as a measure of IT security of a cipher. The concept
may precisely be defined as the smallest length of plaintext for which only one
key value can lead to the observed ciphertext, thus marking the point where
the system is totally broken. Unfortunately, for most data statistics, there is
never a point where the key becomes fixed with probability one and the choice
of a particular unicity point involves an implicit choice of a probability that is
viewed as ‘small enough’ and must, in our opinion, be specified in any insecu-
rity claims. In [6], Shannon estimated the unicity distance of an ensemble of
ciphers satisfying certain ideal conditions that are in general not satisfied for a
given cipher. Even for Shannon’s random cipher (Throughout this Letter, we
will use ‘Shannon’s random cipher ’ to denote the ensemble of ciphers defined
in [6] and ‘random cipher ’ to denote any cipher of the form of Eq. (4). The
reader should keep in mind that they are completely different concepts), there
is no point where the key is fixed with probability one. However, the proba-
bility that the key is erroneously determined by Eve at a designated ‘unicity
point’ can be calculated for this case, as has been done by Hellman in [7]
(see Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 therein). This probability calculation appears
extremely difficult to do for any concrete cipher, random or otherwise.
In view of the generic non-existence of a true unicity point for a cipher, we
prefer to work with a closely related concept defined by Hellman [7] for this
reason and used also by Beauchemin and Brassard [8]. This is the average
number of spurious keys Nk seen by the attacker that we define below following
[8].
Under a given attack, for each ciphertext y, we define the set Ky as:
Ky = {k ∈ K | Pr[Dk(y)] > 0}. (6)
Thus Ky is the set of keys that could give rise to the observed ciphertext y.
Since only one of these keys is the actual one used, the number of spurious
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keys Nk(y) is
Nk(y) = |Ky| − 1. (7)
The average number of spurious keys Nk is defined to be the expectation of
Nk(y) over Y:
Nk =
∑
y
Pr[y]Nk(y) (8)
Since each Nk(y) is non-negative, if Nk = 0, Nk(y) = 0 for all y and the
cipher is broken with probability one.
It is significant to note that a unicity distance n0(p), which gives the short-
est data length n0 from which Eve could determine the key with probability
p, is a useful operational measure of security that one may try to determine
numerically or bound analytically for various types of attacks. Some special
p cases have been obtained previously for known-plaintext quantum joint at-
tacks [9] that yield the fundamental security limit. It is also meaningful to
evaluate n0(p) under heterodyne or other attacks. Indeed, this is being pur-
sued by different groups in Europe, Japan, and the US on αη and similar
cryptosystems.
We stress here that we do not consider Nk by itself to be an operationally
meaningful IT security measure, although it may well provide bounds on such
a measure. Among its drawbacks are the fact that the cardinality alone of
each set Ky defined above gives no feel for the numerical probabilities of its
elements. In addition, the operational meaning of averaging over y may be
questioned. As an example of an operational security measure closely related
to the unicity distance n0(p), we suggest the following ‘Π− function’ defined,
as a function of the data length n for a given attack on a given cipher as:
Π(n) := max
yn
max
k∈Kyn
Pr[k|yn]. (9)
Thus, Π(n) is Eve’s probability on the most likely key maximized over all
possible ciphertext observations of length n. As such, for a chosen ǫ, if it
can be shown that Π ≤ ǫ for the data length of operation, the user can be
guaranteed that the system is broken with a probability not greater than ǫ
no matter what observation Eve gets. In this Letter, we do not study the Π-
function as a security measure since the results on Nk, both those available
and those proven here, are closer in spirit and content to the claims of [1]
and are sufficient to point out the inadequacies in their arguments. Nk can be
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estimated exactly for the Shannon random cipher and equals (see [7]):
Nk = (2
H(K) − 1)2−nD .= 2H(K)−nD, (10)
where D is the per symbol data redundancy in bits, i.e.,
D := log2(|X |)−
H(Xn)
n
. (11)
Note that Nk never becomes exactly zero, so the cipher is never broken with
probability one. However, Shannon took the point where Nk = 1 to be the
‘unicity distance’ n0, so that n0 = H(K)/D using the approximation in Eq.
(10).
For the case of an arbitrary endomorphic nonrandom cipher, i.e., one for which
X = Y , the following result due to Hellman and Beauchemin and Brassard
holds (see [8]):
Theorem 1 (HBB result) For any nonrandom cipher with X = Y ,
Nk ≥ 2H(K)−nD − 1, (12)
Note that, in contrast to Eq. (10), the RHS of Eq. (12) can reach zero. However,
since Theorem 1 gives just a lower bound on Nk, the vanishing of its RHS
does not establish insecurity in any conceivable definition. The approximate
equality of the right-hand sides of (10) and (12) led Hellman [7] to state that
Shannon “random ciphers are essentially the worst possible” in the sense of
having the lowest possible Nk.
Under some restricted assumptions that we do not get into here, Hellman goes
further and gives upper bounds on the probability that Nk ≤ m for any integer
m. These can obviously be translated into lower bounds on the probability that
Nk > m. We do not give the expressions here, because the important point in
our context is that, to judge the insecurity level of a cipher, we would rather
be interested in upper bounds on the probability Pr[Nk > m] which are not
available in the analyses [7] and [8] or elsewhere.
In sum, the available results on Nk for nonrandom ciphers are only lower
bounds. As such, they cannot in principle be used to establish insecurity of a
system, but may conceivably be used in conjunction with a meaningful security
measure to ensure a certain security level.
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3 Lower Bound on Nk for Random Ciphers
The HBB result quoted above can be extended to include random ciphers with
arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y , including continuous alphabet ciphers such
as αη. We prove the extended lower bound in this section.
We need the following lemma that is easily established from standard proper-
ties of entropy and mutual information:
Lemma: For any cipher with plaintext sequence Xn = X1 . . .Xn, ciphertext
sequence Yn = Y1 . . . Yn, and key K, with arbitrary plaintext alphabet X and
arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y , random or non-random,
H(K|Yn) = H(Xn) +H(K)− I(XnK;Yn). (13)
Theorem 2: For any cipher with plaintext sequence Xn = X1 . . .Xn, cipher-
text sequence Yn = Y1 . . . Yn, and key K, with arbitrary plaintext alphabet
X and arbitrary ciphertext alphabet Y , random or non-random,
Nk ≥ 2H(K)+n(log2 |X |−D)−I(XnK;Yn) − 1. (14)
D is defined as before by Eq. (11). Theorem 1 can be recovered from (14) by
observing that I(XnK;Yn) ≤ n log2 |Y| = n log2 |X | when X = Y .
Proof : We proceed as in [8]. We have
H(K|Yn) =∑
y
Pr[y]H(K|y) ≤∑
y
Pr[y] log2(Nk(y) + 1) (15)
≤ log2(
∑
y
Pr[y](Nk(y) + 1)) = log2(Nk + 1). (16)
The inequality (15) follows from the definition eq. (7) of Nk(y) and (16) from
the concavity of the log function [10]. The result follows on substituting for
H(K|Yn) using Lemma 1 and exponentiating both sides. 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the inequality of Theorem 2 to
be satisfied with equality are:-The keys in the set Ky must be equiprobable
for everyy and |Ky| must be the same for all ciphertexts y. Intuitively, these
constraints would not be satisfied for an arbitrary cipher, so the lower bound
cannot be expected to be tight without a detailed analysis on the given cipher.
We have thus extended the HBB result to random ciphers and observed that it
is still just a lower bound on the average number of spurious keys and cannot
therefore provide a basis for an insecurity claim.
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4 Application to αη and the analysis of Ahn & Birnbaum
We assume the description of the αη cryptosystem to be familiar to the reader
from [1] – we use essentially the same notations here. Further details on the
system may be found in [2,3,4,5].
In order to estimate the lower bound in Theorem 2, one needs to estimate
I(XnK;Yn) for the cipher being studied. For αη, it is useful to define a signal
random variable Sn = S1 . . . Sn as
Sn = f (n)(Xn, K), (17)
where f (n) is simply the function of the data n-sequence and the key that out-
puts the corresponding n-sequence of signal angles on the coherent state circle.
f (n) depends on the particular PRNG (denoted ENC hereafter to conform with
usage in earlier papers) used, but its explicit form does not concern us here.
Each Si is an M-ary random variable. Now the ciphertext Y
n = Y1 . . . Yn is
the n-sequence of continuous-variable heterodyne measurements made by Eve,
and may be represented as
Yn = Sn +Rn, (18)
where Rn = R1 . . . Rn, and the {Ri} are independent identically distributed
random variables having an approximately Gaussian distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation σ = M
2
√
N
, N being the mean photon number of
each transmitted coherent state. They represent the heterodyne measurement
noise of each symbol i. For this two-step model of generation of the ciphertext,
note that, for each i, (XiK) → Si → Yi is a Markov chain, and hence so is
Yi → Si → (XiK) and consequently, Yn → Sn → (XnK). Therefore, by the
data processing inequality [10], we have for all n,
I(XnK;Yn) ≤ I(Sn;Yn). (19)
Let us denote the running key sequence emitted by an arbitrary ENC seeded
with a seed key of length |K| by K′ = K ′1 . . .K ′n . . ., where each K ′i is of length
log2(M/2) bits – the length needed to choose a basis on the coherent state
circle. It is clear that the {K ′i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n cannot be statistically independent
beyond a certain n if each segment of the running key has a uniform marginal
distribution (as is the case for a pseudo-random number generator), since the
seed key entropy is limited to |K| and the running key is a deterministic
function of the seed key. This fact shows that, for an arbitrary ENC, there
exists a running key length ndep measured in running-key symbols, beyond
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which {K ′i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are statistically dependent, and that
ndep ≤ |K|/ log2(M/2) (20)
for an arbitrary ENC. ndep is referred to as the ‘dependency distance’. When
a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is used as an ENC, knowing any |K|
consecutive bits of the output running key fixes the seed key and vice versa.
Therefore, for an LFSR, ndep = |K|/ log2(M/2) ≡ ndep(LFSR). Note also
that if the {K ′i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n are statistically dependent, so are the signal
random variables {Si}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
4.1 Ciphertext-only heterodyne attack
Consider first the case of ciphertext-only heterodyne attack on αη, for which
D = 0. Also the plaintext alphabet size |X | = 2 for αη. Ahn and Birnbaum
calculate in [1], a quantity U , that is, in our notation :
U = I(Si; Yi) ∀ i. (21)
This definition makes sense for the LFSR case (it needs a proof in the general
case) because the {Si} do indeed have the same (in fact, uniform) marginal
distributions for each i when the plaintext is uniformly random. It is also true
that I(Sn;Yn) = nU for all n ≤ ndep because, for such data lengths, the
i-th signal symbol in the n-sequence is statistically independent of the rest as
mentioned above. However, this information estimate that is linear in n is not
valid beyond the dependency distance because the running key has correlations
beyond ndep. The argument in [1] that the “pseudo-random number generator
redistributes Eve’s prior probabilities back to the flat distribution for each
new symbol” merely makes U of Eq. (21) well-defined but does not justify the
above estimate. It is the joint probability distribution of the {Si} that goes
into the calculation of I(Sn;Yn) and not the marginal per symbol probability
distribution. In fact, it follows from Theorem 4.2.1 of [10] that
I(Sn;Yn) < nU ∀n > ndep, (22)
and the inequality is strict because the {Si} are not statistically independent.
Even if I(XnK;Yn) is taken to be equal to I(Sn;Yn) (see (19)), the claim in
[1] that the former quantity increases linearly up to n0 = |K|/U cannot be
true. Note that U ≈ 1
2
log2N+1.6≪ log2M in the regime σ =M/(2
√
N)≫ 1
assumed in the calculation of [1] and thus n0 ≫ ndep(LFSR), and thus we are
already well into the region where (22) is a strict inequality. This argument is
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unchanged for a general ENC by virtue of the inequality (20) – the running-key
dependency sets in not later than it does for the LFSR case.
The key argument which to them would make Shannon’s random cipher anal-
ysis in the form of Eq. (2) (or equivalently, Eq. (22) in the form of an equality)
applicable is that for two different running key segments ks and kq at the out-
put of the PRNG “.. values of K which have similar values of kq will have
uncorrelated values of ks for s 6= q.” From the Theorem just cited, (22) is
an equality if and only if the {Si} from 1 to n are jointly statistically inde-
pendent, a condition that cannot be satisfied for n > ndep. Their condition
quoted above seems to be the strictly weaker one that the key segments need
only be pairwise statistically independent. In view of the well-known differ-
ence between pairwise and complete statistical independence of a sequence of
random variables, we feel justified in demanding a rigorous proof of how Eq.
(22) may be “approximately” true under their weaker assumption. We have
assumed that by the word ‘uncorrelated’ in the quotation above, Ahn and
Birnbaum mean ‘statistically independent’ although this is not clear from [1].
Whatever their meaning of the term, we urge them to prove how and to what
degree it leads to an ‘approximate’ satisfaction of the ‘only if’ condition of
Gallager’s theorem that renders (22) an equality.
Therefore, the only conclusion on I(XnK;Yn) derivable from the analysis of
[1] is that
I(XnK;Yn) ≤ nU ∀ n. (23)
Using this in conjunction with Theorem 2 yields the following lower bound on
Nk:
Nk ≥ 2H(K)+n(1−U) − 1. (24)
If we choose to find the data length n‘unicity’ at which the lower bound reads
Nk ≥ 0, we find
n’unicity’ = H(K)/(U − 1), (25)
which is claimed in [1] to be the ‘unicity distance’ of αη, beyond which “Eve’s
entropy on the key will transition from linear decline to asymptotic decay by
analogy to the unicity distance of a classical deterministic cipher...” It is also
claimed that “Eve may have enough information to determine the key with
high probability when n≫ n’unicity’.”
There are several things amiss with such claims. The fact that the linear
decline of Eve’s entropy on the key has already ended at ndep has been noted.
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In addition, the analogy with Shannon’s random cipher does not exist. As
stressed in Sections 2 and 3, for concrete ciphers, the only available results
are lower bounds on Nk against which the analysis of [1] is no exception. As a
matter of principle, a lower bound onNk cannot prove insecurity of a cipher. If
Ahn and Birnbaum wish to claim that Nk is indeed close to zero at n‘unicity’,
they must show both the reasons why the bound of Theorem 2 is tight for αη
and also why I(XnK;Yn)
.
= nU is a good approximation for αη beyond n =
ndep. Also, ifNk is not claimed to be exactly zero (so the key is not determined
with probability one – it is shown in Section 4.2 below that Nk for αη is never
exactly zero for any finite data length n under known-plaintext heterodyne
attack and consequently also for the weaker ciphertext-only attack) – Ahn
and Birnbaum need to estimate the probability with which Eve obtains the
key correctly. As per the discussion of Sections 2 and 3, this probability can
be determined for Shannon’s random cipher but has never been done for any
standard cipher, let alone αη. This fact does not make all previous work in
cryptography meaningless because the bulk of it is concerned with complexity-
based security under specific attacks and not information-theoretic security
which is under consideration here. Without such a calculation, a statement like
“Eve may have enough information to determine the key with high probability
when n ≫ n’unicity’.” is unfalsifiable – it does not satisfy the requirement of
being a scientific claim over and above (1) without quantifying both how high
the probability is and how much greater than n‘unicity’ n needs to be.
4.2 Statistical and Known-Plaintext Attacks
For general statistical attacks, i.e., those for which H(Xn) < n, Ahn and
Birnbaum claim that a simple additive stream cipher (ASC) is broken “with
high probability” when
n−H(Xn)≫ |K|, (26)
and, by comparison, αη is broken “with high probability” when
n(U + 1)−H(Xn)≫ |K|. (27)
These assertions are again justified by analogy to Shannon’s random cipher
analysis, and are interpreted as implying that αη is broken at smaller data
lengths than the ASC because of the added factor of (U +1) in equation (27).
As before, since the terms “high probability” and “≫” have no precise mean-
ing, these claims are unfalsifiable until they are quantified. As with standard
ciphers under many statistical attacks, by choosing n large enough, we can
12
drive the probability of finding the key as close to 1 as desired. This is the
content of eq. (1), but the equations above ostensibly claim more than that.
We contend that what they claim is not well-defined without quantitative
meaning given to “high probability” and “≫”.
Rigorous bounds, different from (26) and (27) although similar in form, can
be obtained from an application of our Theorem 2. For the ASC, we have
trivially that I(XnK;Yn) ≤ H(Yn) ≤ n. Substituting this into the RHS of
Theorem 2 gives the lower bound
Nk ≥ 2H(K)−nD − 1, (28)
which is just the HBB result. As we did for ciphertext-only attacks, setting
the lower bound to zero gives the condition (compare (26) )
n−H(Xn) ≥ |K| (29)
that must be satisfied if Nk = 0. As such, this is simply a necessary condition
for Nk = 0 and does not imply the latter.
For αη, using Eq. (22) in Theorem 2 and rewriting D in terms of H(Xn) gives
the lower bound
Nk ≥ 2H(K)+H(Xn)−nU − 1. (30)
Setting the RHS to zero, gives the necessary condition (compare (27) )
nU −H(Xn) ≥ |K| (31)
for Nk = 0. It is not a sufficient condition for the latter, which, as we show
below, is never true except at n =∞ even for known-plaintext attacks. As is
the case for all applications of Theorem 2, there is no proof that Nk approxi-
mately equals the RHS of Eq. (30) which would be needed to make insecurity
claims on its basis. Again, it is essential to provide estimates of the probability
that the key is found correctly by Eve to prove insecurity.
Indeed, there is no evidence that (25) is valid as an approximate estimate
of ‘unicity distance’. The numerical result quoted in [1] for the simulation
of [11] yields a ‘unicity distance’ too small by a factor ∼ 300, which shows
U ∼ 1 when (25) is used instead of U ∼ 300. While such comparison has
little meaning when the attack success probability is not specified, it surely is
unreasonable to claim, as in [1], that such a large discrepancy exists because
of the suboptimal processing used in [11].
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Intuitively, the measurement noise in αη would make it more secure than an
additive stream cipher instead of worse as claimed in [1] at least for the case
of known-plaintext attacks where H(Xn) = 0. In this case, an ASC is broken
with probability 1 at the nondegeneracy distance nd defined in [2], which is
just nd = |K| for an LFSR. On the other hand, it is clearly not possible to pin
down the seed key at this n with probability 1 in the case of αη. As a matter
of fact, the true unicity point of αη using any ENC, i.e., the point where the
key is determined with probability one, is infinite under even known-plaintext
attacks. To see this, note that, irrespective of what ENC is, in the more exact
continuous Gaussian-noise model of the noise Ri used in [1] (as opposed to
the wedge approximation used in [3]), there is always a non-zero probability,
however small, that a Yn that is close to any given n-sequence of signal points
on the coherent state circle may arise from any data sequence Xn and any
running key and thus seed key K. Furthermore, a large fraction (in terms of
probability) of such events for Eve occur without giving rise to any detection
error for Bob. In particular, the close approximation to Ri consisting of a
continuous probability distribution cut off at 900 on each side of the signal
point Si would give zero error for Bob and infinite unicity distance because
every allowed basis n-sequence is still possible given the ciphertext, albeit some
are highly unlikely. The above argument shows that the true unicity point is
not reached for any finite n. Together with the fact that limn→∞Nk = 0
proven in Section 1 we have that the unicity distance is infinite. This fact that
Nk 6= 0 for any specified finite distance underscores the necessity of providing
probability estimates to any claims that the system is broken at that distance.
These estimates are not provided in [1] and seem thus far difficult to obtain,
although some progress is currently being made by various research groups.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we have shown, both by arguing the non-existence of an analogy
to Shannon’s random cipher and by a direct analysis of their final claim (2),
that the arguments of Ahn and Birnbaum do not establish the insecurity of
αη. Rigorously true results similar in form to their expressions are derived
as corollaries of the lower bound on Nk (Theorem 2). It is noted that these
results, being lower bounds, cannot in principle establish insecurity of any
system. We also noted the lack of any estimates by Ahn and Birnbaum of the
probability that αη is broken at the claimed distance (which they also did
not clearly delimit) to be a serious loophole insofar as it makes their claim of
insecurity unfalsifiable.
There are other points mentioned in [1] that we disagree with but cannot
get into in any detail here. One concerns the comparison of αη with DSR to
an ASC, and another about the existence of a proven secure concrete BB84
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cryptosystem. While the work in [1] does not throw light on the true security
level of αη, further efforts in this direction are possible and welcome.
6 Added Comment
In their response [12] to our Comment, Ahn and Birnbaum abandon the Shan-
non random cipher analogy argument of their original paper [1] and repeat
their other qualitative argument that PRNG outputs ”will mimic those of a
true random number generator”. If that is the case, there is no need for all the
work on cryptographic encryption. Given the previously known condition (1)
of our Comment, the problem here is quantitative. For example, for a fixed
data bit length n equal to the seedkey length under known-plaintext attack,
a conventional cipher is broken with probability 1. If the bare αη is broken
with probability ∼ 10−4 irrespective of complexity, it is already a significant
improvement. Since we have given intuitive as well as rigorous arguments on
why these authors’ main claim, our (2), is merely a lower bound that can
yield no insecurity conclusion, its validity can only be established by rigorous
quantitative reasoning the authors have not provided.
They also give a simulation example for seedkey size = 13 with other fixed
system parameters. It is not spelled out exactly how the reported simulation
was carried out. In particular, we cannot assess whether or not the method
of updating the eavesdropper’s probabilities in the simulation uses any of the
assumptions the simulation purports to validate. We do not comment on it not
only for this reason but also because their original paper used only theoretical
arguments to support their conclusion. These arguments remain the same,
and our theoretical refutation still stands. The importance of addressing our
theoretical refutation lies in the fact that a single numerical example cannot
validate a general quantitative conclusion. It would indeed be interesting if
a complete numerical study can be carried out for realistic key sizes to show
the dependence of the results on the system parameters. However, such study
appears exceedingly difficult due to the complexity involved.
The authors do not dispute the unfalsifiability of their claim given by our (2)
in the absence of meaning given to “≈” and “≪”. Regarding their claim given
by (3) in our Letter, insofar as it is meant to say something over and above our
(1), the alleged counter-example in their Reply does not make (3) falsifiable
because the example does not satisfy (1). The issue could be easily resolved
if these authors just define their symbols and give the success probability
estimate, which they still have not done. There is no analogy between their
claim and the examples they give, their (7) with tanx ≈ x and their (8). The
elementary point to be made here is that the approximation error in those
cases can be readily estimated rigorously on demand. In contrast, their main
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result given by our (2) is merely a lower bound on HE(K) – the crux of the
matter is that the gap between HE(K) and the right-hand side is unknown.
We cannot go into here the other side issues raised by these authors in their
Reply. We may just mention that the rigorous examination of unicity distance
for given success probability under a given attack is possible and being pursued
by us and other groups.
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